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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
It is a generally accepted principle of good governance that effective legal 
remedies should be available in the case of the breach of a legal duty by a 
procuring entity. In public procurement this will, amongst others, ensure 
accountability, equitability and the integrity of the procurement regime. A 
number of international instruments contain prescriptions on remedies that will 
vindicate the rights of participants in the procurement process. It is generally 
accepted that a range of remedies may qualify as effective and that effective 
remedies are not limited to orders ad pecuniam solvendam.  
 
In South African law, public tender processes are regarded as administrative 
processes, but once the tender is awarded, the parties conclude a contract 
where after their relationship is governed by the law of contract. Public 
procurement is thus a field where the principles of both public and private law 
are relevant. Public and private law remedies may also be available to 
aggrieved parties, depending on the stage in the procurement process and the 
status of the party. Should a public tender, after it has been awarded and a 
contract entered into between the parties, be set aside on review, the contract 
so concluded between the public entity and successful tenderer, is void. This 
entails that no contractual remedies are available to the initially successful 
tenderer. In Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape1
                                            
* Rolien Roos Senior Lecturer and Stephen de la Harpe Associate Professor, Faculty of Law 
North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus. 
1  Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007(3) SA 121 (CC). The reference 
of the case as reported in the Supreme Court of Appeal is 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA). 
Hereafter the Steenkamp-case. 
 the 
Constitutional Court had to consider whether an initially successful tenderer 
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could lodge a delictual claim for damages to compensate for expenses incurred 
after conclusion of a contract, which was subsequently rendered void on an 
application for review of the tender award. 
 
The Public Finance Management Act,2 which regulates public procurement on 
national and provincial level, does not address the issue of delictual liability and 
the question is whether delictual liability would not be an (or the only) 
appropriate remedy in certain circumstances. This contribution will focus on the 
reasoning of the various South African courts in the Steenkamp-case in order to 
establish whether the current legal position on delictual liability in the event of 
setting aside a tender award, is in conformity with the principles of good 
governance and the principles as set out in the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Public Procurement (hereinafter referred to as the 'Model Law') and the 
General Procurement Agreement of the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter 
referred to as the GPA).3
                                            
2  Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. The Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act 56 of 2003, which regulates procurement on local government level, in s 
176 provides that: "No municipality or any of its political structures, political office-bearers 
or officials, no municipal entity or its board of directors or any of its directors or officials, 
and no other organ of state or person exercising a power or performing a function in terms 
of this Act, is liable in respect of any loss or damage resulting from the exercise of that 
power or the performance of that function in good faith." 
3  The reason for comparing the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the GPA is that 
these two instruments are internationally accepted as benchmarks for public procurement. 
 
 
The principles of good governance and the provisions on public procurement as 
contained in the Model Law and the GPA, relating to accountability, with 
specific reference to the payment of compensation for damages suffered, will 
be considered first. An analysis of the Steenkamp-decisions will follow. In 
conclusion, the effect of these decisions will be measured against the 
applicable principles of good governance and the mentioned international 
instruments. 
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2 The principles of good governance 
The search for a governance system that works well is as old as the idea of 
government itself. The concept of good governance was however again 
brought to the fore in 1989 in a report by the World Bank on the economic and 
development problems of sub-Saharan Africa.4
A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been 
the failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market 
mechanisms are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good 
governance – a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that 
is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public.
 The report reflected on why 
structural adjustment programmes had failed to create economic growth. 
  
In the foreword to the report the then president of the World Bank, Barber 
Conable, stated: 
 
5
It was also stated in the report: 
 
 
6
One of the aspects identified by the World Bank, in the 1989 report, as part of 
good governance, was the overhaul of the procurement policies of some 
 
 
The rule of law needs to be established. In many instances this 
implies rehabilitation of the judicial system, independence for the 
judiciary, scrupulous respect for the law and human rights at every 
level of government, transparent accounting of public monies and 
independent public auditors responsible to a representative 
legislature, not to an executive. Independent institutions are neces-
sary to ensure public accountability. The widespread perception in 
many countries is that the appropriation of the machinery of 
government by the elite to serve their own interests is at the root of 
this crisis of governance. The willingness of the donor community to 
tolerate impropriety – by failing to insist on scrupulous conduct by 
their own suppliers, by not ensuring that funds are properly used, by 
overlooking inadequate accounting and auditing, and by tolerating 
generally lax procurement procedures – aggravates the malaise. 
Everyone avowedly deplores the situation and wishes it were 
otherwise. But it will not be so until accountability is instituted. 
 
                                            
4  World Bank Report Sub-Saharan Africa. 
5  Ibid at xii. 
6  Ibid at 192. 
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states.7
The concept of good governance gained momentum in that many international 
organisations, in particular those involved in developmental and financial 
assistance, to ensure that the financial assistance be properly directed, 
required good governance by a borrowing state.
 This was seen as a prerequisite for sustainable growth and the 
continued provision of aid by many international organisations. 
 
8
The debate on good governance was not limited to Africa and in the context of 
governance in the European Union it led to the White Paper on European 
Governance being published by the European Commission in July 2001.
  
 
9 Good 
administration was seen as part of good governance. According to the 
European Commission White Paper on Administrative Reform,10 the key 
principles thereof are service, independence, responsibility, accountability, 
efficiency and transparency. The above triggered a wide discussion on the 
concept of good governance and it has become a popular subject for 
discussion by many.11
It is not intended to give a comprehensive definition of good governance as the 
content of the concept of good governance largely depends on the aims for 
which it is used. Financial institutions tend to focus more on economic reforms, 
whereas the more political organisations focus more on human rights.
  
 
12
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, 
public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing 
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
 We will 
confine ourselves to a few definitions. 
 
Governance is defined by the United Nations Commission for Global 
Governance as follows: 
 
                                            
7  World Bank Report supra n 5 at 15. 
8  Wouters and Ruyngaert Working Paper 69. 
9  Commission of the European Communities White Paper 428. 
10  Accepted by the Commission on 1 March 2000. See EC White Paper 200. 
11  Curtin and Dekker Good Governance. 
12  Wouters and Ruyngaert “Good Governance" 69-70. 
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accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes 
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, 
as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either 
have agreed to or perceive to be in their interests.13
[C]reating well-functioning and accountable institutions – political, 
juridical and administrative – that citizens regard as legitimate, 
through which they participate in decisions that affect their lives, and 
by which they are empowered. Good governance also entails a 
respect for human rights and the rule of law generally.
  
 
According to the Secretary General of the UN good governance means: 
 
14
Good governance is the respect for the rule of law, openness, 
transparency and accountability to democratic institutions; fairness 
and equity in dealings with citizens, including mechanisms for 
consultation and participation; efficient, effective services; clear, 
transparent and applicable laws and regulations; consistency and 
coherence in policy formation; and high standards of ethical 
behaviour.
 
 
The Organisation for Economic Development (herein later referred to as the 
OECD) defines good governance as follows: 
  
15
[P]articipation, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, 
consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and 
efficiency and accountability.
 
 
It is defined by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific as: 
 
16
[T]ransparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and 
responsiveness to the needs of people.
  
 
 Resolution 2000/64 of the UN Human Rights Committee defines it as: 
 
17
Within the EU, the commission has identified five principles of good governance 
namely; openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.
  
 
18
                                            
13  Ibid at 9; Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighborhood 2. 
14  UN Doc A/53/1 at par 114. 
  
15  OECD http://www.oecd.org/ 21 Feb. 
16  UNESCAP http://www.unescap.org/ 21 Feb. 
17  Commission on Human Rights http://www.unhchr.ch/ 21 Feb. 
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It can be safely stated that there is agreement about the following core 
principles of good governance: transparency, accountability, participation, the 
rule of law, effectiveness, efficiency, proportionality, consistency and 
coherence. These principles are, generally speaking, also applicable to public 
procurement. 
 
Good governance in public procurement was also addressed by the World 
Bank and international organisations like the OECD and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (herein later referred to as APEC). For purposes of this 
discussion it is only necessary to deal with the requirement of accountability in 
public procurement in any detail. The principle of accountability includes at the 
least democratic control of the administration (for example, attribute supervisory 
powers to a minister) and the right to effective legal protection.  
 
The World Bank, through its Economic and Sector Work, developed its Country 
Procurement Assessment Report (herein after referred to as the CPAR) 
procedure during July 2000.19
a) Are government employees expected to follow a published code of 
ethics? 
 The CPAR is intended to be an analytical tool to 
diagnose the health of the existing public procurement system in a country. The 
questions posed when evaluating accountability are the following: 
 
b) Is there an accessible and secure process for bidders to report bribes by 
others and solicitation/extortion of bribes by government officials? 
c) Do bidders have adequate access to administrative or judicial 
review/appeal? 
d) Are there measures/initiatives to curb/control corruption, for example, 
anti-corruption statutes and/or bodies, whistle-blower statutes, 
comprehensive reforms of the civil service/judiciary, regional initiatives, 
provisions in the criminal law, anti-bribery provisions, et cetera? 
                                                                                                                               
18  Commission of the European Communities supra n 9 at 10. 
19  See World Bank http://web.worldbank.org/ 21 Feb. 
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The Development Assistance Committee (herein later referred to as DAC) of 
the OECD developed guidelines for what they consider to be a well-functioning 
public procurement system.20 Some of the cornerstones identified are integrity 
and transparency. It includes the availability of mechanisms and capacity for 
independent control and audit of procurement operations to provide for 
accountability and compliance. This implies that there must be a system for 
participants in the public procurement process to lodge complaints and 
challenge decisions. Administrative and judicial review bodies must have both 
appropriate levels of independence and the legal power to impose corrective 
measures and remedies against entities in breach of the legal and regulatory 
framework.21
APEC established a Government Procurement Experts Group (herein later 
referred to as the GPEG) during 1995 to consider ways to achieve increased 
transparency and liberalisation of government procurement markets.
 
 
In the document it is emphasised that such a complaint review and remedy 
system, provides an important contribution to the compliance environment and 
integrity of the public procurement system. Such a system must be seen to 
operate efficiently and fairly and to provide balanced unbiased decisions.  
 
22
                                            
20  DAC 
 The 
GPEG developed a set of APEC Non-Binding Principles on Government 
Procurement (herein later referred to as NBPs), which were endorsed by APEC 
leaders at their meeting in 1999 in Auckland, New Zealand. The principles are 
value for money, open and effective competition, fair dealing, accountability and 
due process, and non-discrimination. Under accountability and due process is 
included that mechanisms should be put in place for handling complaints about 
procurement processes or alleged breaches of procurement laws/regulations/-
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/14/34336126.pdf 17 Jul. This document was 
published as part of the Joint OECD/DAC-World Bank Procurement Round Table Initiative 
after the Third Round Table in Johannesburg in 2004. It's aim is to find reliable and 
sustainable ways to enhance the functioning of public procurement systems. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/14/34336126.pdf 21 Feb. 
21  Ibid. 
22  APEC http://www.apecsec.org.sg/ 21 Feb. 
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policies/procedures which cannot be resolved through direct consultation with 
the procuring agency in the first instance. Such mechanisms should provide for 
independent, impartial, transparent, timely and effective procedures for the 
review of such complaints or alleged breaches. In practice, this can include 
providing for correction of the breaches or compensation for the loss or 
damages caused, which may be limited to the costs of tender preparation or 
protest.23
The South African Constitution requires public procurement to be done in 
accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost effective.
 
 
24 The Constitution also provides that the public administration 
must be governed by the principles enshrined in the Constitution including, 
amongst others, the principle of accountability.25
                                            
23  Review of the APEC Non-Binding Principles (NBPs) on Government Procurement, 
document 2006/SOM3/GPEG/005.  
24  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 217 (hereafter the Constitution). 
25  S 195. 
 The above relates to 
requirements that can also be classified as prerequisites for good governance 
in public procurement.  
 
From the above it can be concluded that the principle of accountability in good 
governance in public procurement entails that there must be a system which 
provides adequate access for the lodging of complaints and challenges by 
means also of judicial review or appeal. These review and appeal bodies must 
have the appropriate level of independence and the legal power to impose 
corrective measures and remedies against entities in breach of the legal and 
regulatory framework. These mechanisms must be independent, impartial, 
transparent, timely and effective. The remedies can include the correction of 
breaches, compensation for loss or damages and may be limited to the costs of 
tender preparation or protest. 
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3 Effective remedies in public procurement as provided for in the 
Model Law and the GPA 
3.1 Model Law 
The Model Law makes provision for both administrative and judicial review.26
Provision is firstly made for internal review by the procuring entity itself, or if its 
decisions have to be approved by an authority, by that authority,
 It 
provides for recourse if any tenderer claims to have suffered, or to in future 
suffer, loss or injury due to a breach of a duty imposed on a procuring entity.  
 
27 secondly for 
administrative review,28 and lastly for judicial review.29 Certain decisions in the 
procurement process are however not subject to such review by the 
administrative review bodies.30
With regard to internal review, save where the procurement contract has 
already entered into force,
 
 
31 the complaint must, within 20 days of the date 
when the tenderer became aware, or should have become aware, of the 
circumstances giving raise to the claim,32 be submitted in writing to the head of 
the procuring entity, or the approving authority should the decision by the 
procuring entity be subject to a decision by an approving authority.33
                                            
26  Art 52-57. 
27  Art 53. 
28  Art 54. The review bodies are provided for in art 52(1). 
29  Art 57. 
30  Art 52(2). These are: the selection of a method of procurement pursuant to art 18-22; the 
choice of a selection procedure pursuant to art 41(1); the limitation of procurement 
proceedings in accordance with art 8 on the basis of nationality; a decision by the 
procuring entity under art 12 to reject all tenders, proposals, offers or quotations; a refusal 
by the procuring entity to respond to an expression of interest in participating in request-
for-proposals proceedings pursuant to art 48 (2); and an omission referred to in art 27 (t) 
(the omission to include certain information in the solicitation documents) or art 38 (s) (the 
omission to include certain information in the request for proposals). 
31  Art 53(1) and (3). Art 53(3) states that a complaint need not be entertained, or continue to 
be entertained, after the procurement contract entered into force, which creates the 
impression of it being discretionary. Subs (1) states that unless the procurement contract 
has been entered into, the complaint shall be lodged with the procuring entity, or approving 
authority. It seems prudent that once the contract has been entered into the procuring 
entity or approving authority should be functus officio and any dispute be resolved by 
another body.  
32  Art 53(2). 
33  Art 53(1). 
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If the complaint is not resolved by mutual agreement, a written decision must 
be issued within 30 days after the submission of the complaint.34 Such decision 
must state the reasons for the decision and if the complaint is upheld, in whole 
or in part, indicate the corrective measures to be taken.35 Such a decision is 
final unless administrative or judicial review proceedings are instituted.36 If a 
decision is not issued within the specified time the tenderer is entitled to 
immediately institute administrative or judicial review proceedings.37 As soon as 
such proceedings are instituted the competence of the procuring entity, or 
approving authority, to entertain the complaint, falls away.38
The possibility of administrative review, provided for in the Model Law, is 
optional as some legal systems do not provide for a hierarchical administrative 
review procedure.
  
 
39 If administrative review is provided for, the option exists for 
the administrative review body, either to only make recommendations, or to 
grant one or more of the remedies provided for in the Model Law.40 Save for 
dismissing the complaint the remedies that may be granted by the 
administrative reviewing body are:41
a) to issue a declaration of the legal rules or principles that govern the 
subject-matter of the complaint;
  
42
b) to prohibit the procuring entity from acting unlawfully, or to make an 
unlawful decision, or to follow an unlawful procedure;
  
43
c) to require the procuring entity that has acted or proceeded unlawfully, or 
reached an unlawful decision, to act or to proceed lawfully or to reach a 
lawful decision;
  
44
                                            
34  Art 53(4). 
35  Art 53(4)(a) and (b). 
36  Art 53(6). 
37  Art 53(5). 
38  Art 53(5). 
39  N to art 54. 
40  N to art 54(3). 
41  Art 54(3). 
42  Art 54(3)(a). 
43  Art 54(3)(b). 
44  Art 54(3)(c). 
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d) to annul, in whole or in part, an unlawful act or decision of the procuring 
entity, other than any act or decision bringing the procurement contract 
into force;45
e) to revise an unlawful decision by the procuring entity or substitute its 
own decision for such a decision, other than any decision bringing the 
procurement contract into force;
  
46
f) to require the payment of compensation, as a first option either for any 
reasonable costs incurred by the tenderer submitting the complaint in 
connection with the procurement proceedings as a result of an unlawful 
act or decision of, or procedure followed by, the procuring entity, or as a 
second option for loss or injury suffered by the tenderer submitting the 
complaint in connection with the procurement proceedings;
  
47
g) to order that the procurement proceedings be terminated.
 and  
48
 
  
Such decision by the administrative review body shall be issued, in writing, 
within 30 days stating the remedies granted and the reasons for the decision.49 
Such a decision will be final save if judicial review proceedings50 are 
instituted.51
Provision is made for judicial review by a court with jurisdiction, with regard to 
actions where a tenderer claims to have suffered, or may in future, suffer loss 
or injury because of the breach of a duty imposed by the law, and petitions for 
judicial review of decisions made by review bodies, or of the failure of those 
bodies to make a decision within the time limits prescribed.
 
 
52
                                            
45  Art 54(3)(d). 
46  Art 54(3)(e). 
47  Art 54(3)(f). The Model Law gives two options in this instance, either of which can be 
adopted by the state enacting the Model Law.  
48  Art 54(3)(g). 
49  Art 54(4). 
50  Under art 57. 
51  Art 54(5). 
52  Art 56(6). 
 The Model Law, 
as can be expected does not regulate this in any detail as it will depend on the 
legal system of the country, which adopts the Model Law, what such judicial 
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review will entail. No provision is made as to what remedies should be available 
in the case of judicial review.  
 
3.2 General Procurement Agreement 
The GPA promotes an initial consultation process between a supplier and a 
procuring entity in the event of a complaint by a supplier that there has been a 
breach of the GPA.53 In such an event the procuring entity must timeously and 
impartially consider such a complaint. This must be done in a manner that is 
not prejudicial to obtaining corrective measures under the challenge system.54
With regard to challenge procedures it is provided that each state party to the 
GPA shall provide procedures to challenge alleged breaches of the GPA in the 
context of procurement in which they have or had an interest. These 
procedures must be non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective.
 
 
55 It 
must also be made generally available in writing.56 Documentation relating to all 
aspects of the process concerning procurements must be retained for three 
years.57 Specified time limits may be set for the notification and initiation of the 
challenge procedures from the time when the basis of the complaint is known 
or should reasonably have been known. The period may not be less than 10 
days.58
Challenges must be heard by a court or by an impartial and independent review 
body. Such body may have no interest in the outcome of the procurement. The 
members thereof must be secure from external influence during their term of 
appointment.
  
 
59
                                            
53  Art XX:1. 
54  Art XX:1. 
55  Art XX:2. 
56  Art XX:3. 
57  Art XX:4. 
58  Art XX:5. 
  
59  Art XX:6. A review body which is not a court shall either be subject to judicial review or 
shall have procedures which provide that: (a) participants can be heard before an opinion 
is given or a decision is reached; (b) participants can be represented and accompanied; 
(c) participants shall have access to all proceedings; (d) proceedings can take place in 
public; (e) opinions or decisions are given in writing with a statement describing the basis 
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The challenge procedures must provide for:  
• rapid interim measures to correct breaches of the GPA and preserve 
commercial opportunities;60
• an assessment and a possibility for a decision on the merits of the 
challenge;
  
61
• the correction of the breach or compensation for the loss or damages 
suffered. This may be limited to the cost for preparing the tender or the 
protest.
 and 
62
 
  
The challenge procedures must be completed timeously.63
It can be concluded from the above that both the Model Law and the GPA 
provide for detailed challenge procedures in public procurement. Such 
challenges must be heard by an impartial and independent body, which may be 
an administrative or judicial body. Provision can be made for both 
administrative and judicial recourse. The procedures must be timely, 
transparent and effective. In the case of damages suffered by the complainant 
such damages may be limited to the reasonable costs incurred.
 
 
64
As can be expected, as both the Model Law and the GPA are meant to 
constitute a framework for public procurement, they do not regulate every 
aspect of public procurement in detail. They do however set forth applicable 
  
 
                                                                                                                               
for the opinions or decisions; (f) witnesses can be presented; (g) documents are disclosed 
to the review body. 
60  Art XX s 7(a). Such action may result in the suspension of the procurement process. The 
procedures may provide that overriding adverse consequences for the interests concerned 
may be taken into account when deciding whether such measures should be applied. 
These interests include the public interest. In such instances just cause for not providing 
interim measures must be provided in writing. 
61  Art XX:7(b). 
62  Art XX:7(c). 
63  Art XX:8. 
64  It is interesting to note that in the EEC no reference is made that damages can be limited 
to costs incurred in the case of an infringement of the directives on public procurement. 
Directive 89/665/EEC art 2 states with regard to public procurement that Member States 
shall ensure that the measures taken concerning the review procedures include provisions 
for the power to award damages to persons harmed by an infringement. 
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principles which will ensure good governance in public procurement. In the 
discussion of the Steenkamp-decision hereunder, the detail will be dealt with to 
ascertain whether the application of the South African law, in this case, 
complies with the principles discussed above. 
 
 
4 The Steenkamp-case 
4.1 Facts  
In Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape65 the plaintiff was the 
liquidator of a company by the name of Balraz (Pty) Ltd. The company was, 
prior to its liquidation, awarded a tender and entered into a contract with the 
provincial government for the delivery of services related to an automated cash 
payment system for social and other grants in the Eastern Cape. The award of 
the tender and contract with Balraz was later set aside upon application for 
review by one of the unsuccessful tenderers.66 Balraz’s liquidator claimed out-
of-pocket expenses, consisting mainly of director’s and consultants’ 
remuneration, the company incurred after being awarded the tender.67 The 
Interim Constitution68 and the Provincial Tender Board Act (Eastern Cape)69
Exceptions were taken against both claims in that it was alleged that the 
particulars of claims did not constitute causes of action. The exception against 
the claim based on contract was upheld and the matter was referred to trial on 
the claim based on delict. With regard to the alleged delict, the plaintiff had to 
prove, amongst others, unlawfulness and negligence. The averments by the 
plaintiff were that the tender board owed Balraz a legal duty and that it 
 
were applicable to the tender proceedings. The claims instituted by the 
liquidator were based on delict and contract.  
 
                                            
65  Supra n 1. 
66  See the decision in Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province ao 1999 
(1) SA 324 Ck. 
67  At 155-156. 
68  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
69  Provincial Tender Board Act 2 of 1994 (EC). 
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negligently failed to discharge that duty. The legal duty was averred to be as 
follows: 
 
[T]he Board owed Balraz a duty in law to (i) exercise its powers and 
perform its functions fairly, impartially and independently; (ii) take 
reasonable care in the evaluation and investigation of tenders; (iii) 
properly evaluate the tenders within the parameters imposed by 
tender requirements; and (iv) ensure that the award of the tender 
was reasonable in the circumstances.70
It was common cause that Balraz was not incorporated as a company when the 
tender was submitted. For this reason, the court a quo held that the tender 
submission by Balraz was invalid and that the tender board did not owe it any 
legal duty. The claim was dismissed as unlawfulness was not proved.
 
 
71
4.2 The courts a quo on unlawfulness 
 The 
matter went on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal where the decision by 
the court a quo was upheld. A further appeal was thereafter heard by the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
The court a quo, which dealt with the exceptions against the claims, held, with 
regard to the claim based on delict, that any act or omission by the tender 
board that would result in a person suffering damages, would be unlawful as 
the board cannot act as it pleases and cause loss to others. It therefore 
dismissed the exception against the particulars of claim based on delict and 
referred the matter to trial on the delictual claim.72
The trial court approached the matter more guardedly. It held that all tenderers 
are entitled to a lawful and fair process, according to the legislation governing 
procurement, which was enacted in the interest of the tenderers and the state. 
Should the process be flawed, an unsuccessful tenderer may apply for review. 
An initially successful tenderer, whose contract is declared void by the review 
court, however has no remedy except possibly a claim for damages. The trial 
judge was not of the opinion that to award damages to parties such as Balraz 
  
 
                                            
70  At 156. 
71  At 157.  
72  At 158-159. 
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would unduly hamper the board in performing its functions, but that it would 
rather encourage a higher standard of care and conformity with the principle of 
accountability. It was of the opinion that potential plaintiffs constituted a small 
number and the argument that to allow such claims would open the floodgates 
for similar claims was for this reason irrelevant. The judge referred to a duty of 
care that could arise, depending on the circumstances, if it is foreseeable that a 
bona fide successful tenderer could incur expenses to perform in accordance 
with the contract, if, unbeknown to him, the awarding of the contract was 
defective. Should the tender award and contract subsequently be set aside, 
such a successful tenderer would suffer loss. However, due to the fact that 
Balraz never submitted a valid tender, no administrative relationship existed; 
there was no foreseeability of harm and consequently no unlawfulness.73
4.3 The Supreme Court of Appeal on unlawfulness 
 The 
claim for damages was therefore dismissed. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal criticised the trail court’s use of the term 'duty of 
care' and held that foreseeability is not always a requirement for unlawfulness. 
The term 'legal duty', although ambiguous, should rather be used. A legal duty 
may stem from a statute74 or the common law. However, all administrative law 
duties do not amount to legal duties in the delictual sense.75 The first step in the 
process to determine whether damages are due would be to ascertain whether 
a statutory or common law duty exists. Although these may overlap, statutory 
interpretation will determine whether a right of action is conferred following non-
conformance with a statutory duty, while policy considerations will be decisive if 
a common law duty is under consideration.76
If a statutory duty was created, the question should be whether the legislature 
intended to provide for claims for damages. The court therefore applied the 
'intention of the legislature' approach to the interpretation of the applicable 
statute. To determine the intention, the purpose and object of the legislation 
  
 
                                            
73  At 159. 
74  The applicable statute being the Provincial Tender Board Act (EC) supra n 69.  
75  At 159-160. 
76  At 160. 
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must be ascertained. The same policy factors that would be relevant in an 
enquiry whether a common law duty existed will normally be applied. Relying 
on an English dictum77 the court held that no common law duty of care will exist 
if it is not the policy of the statute to create liability to pay compensation.78 If a 
statutory duty exists and non-compliance thereof gives rise to delictual 
damages, a common-law legal duty does not exist. If non-compliance of the 
statutory duty does not give rise to delictual damages, a common-law duty 
cannot exist either, as this would be in conflict with the statutory scheme. It 
would be unlikely that a common-law duty would exist if the statute is 
ambiguous regarding damages.79
The appellant did not rely on any statutory or constitutional duty for its claim but 
argued that the duties, mentioned above, were common-law duties that have 
their origin in the basic principles of administrative law, and that it was merely 
by chance that the common-law duties overlapped with the duties imposed in 
terms of the relevant act. The court found this argument problematic as 
administrative law has now “been subsumed by the constitutional dispensation 
and every failure of administrative justice amounts to a breach of a 
constitutional duty”. The question is therefore whether the Constitution provides 
for damages as an appropriate remedy.
 This construction led to the conclusion that 
administrative decisions that are authorised by statute, can only give rise to 
claims for damages if the statute provides as such – reliance cannot be placed 
on any common-law duty but only on the existence of a statutory duty coupled 
with a statutory 'policy' or purpose to create delictual liability in cases of non-
compliance.  
 
80
                                            
77  Stovin v Wise (Norfolk County Council, Third Party) [l996] AC 923 (HL) 1996 3 All ER 801 
(AC).  
78  At 160-161. 
79  At 161. The court did preface this section with: “One has to concede that our case law is 
not clear when it comes to drawing the boundary between liability due to the breach of a 
statutory duty and that of a common-law one. It appears to me that…” 
80  At 161. 
 The court stated that the “problem 
becomes more complex” due to the subsequent promulgation of Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA, which does not govern the present 
case) – and that, referring to the remedies provided for in PAJA, 
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It may not be without significance that an award for damages is not 
one of them, although an award of ‘compensation’ in exceptional 
circumstances is possible. This could imply that remedies for 
administrative justice now have to be found within the four corners of 
its provisions and that a reliance on common-law principles might be 
out of place.81
… per se unlawful (in the sense of contra legem): it simply makes 
the decision or non-decision vulnerable to legal challenge and, until 
set aside, it is valid. The award of the tender in this case was not 
unlawful, it was merely vulnerable. I raise this to indicate that an act 
by an administrator, which is clearly unauthorised (whether expressly 
or impliedly) or which violates some or other legal prohibition will 
probably not be subject to the constraints as to remedy that I have 
mentioned. For instance, in Cameu the relevant minister was held 
liable in damages for a purported administrative decision which he 
was not authorised to make at all. His decision was not only wrong, it 
was impermissible. Proper categorisation of the administrative error 
is therefore also important because it is unhelpful to call every 
administrative error ‘unlawful’, thereby implying that it is wrongful in 
 
 
It is unclear what the 'four corners' of remedies in terms of PAJA would be, as 
section 8 contains the broad opening phrase allowing a court to grant any order 
it deems just and equitable including, but not limited to, the orders listed. If the 
enquiry had been whether the Constitution allows for damages as an 
appropriate remedy, sections 38 and 172(1)(b) of the Constitution need to have 
been considered. Section 38 provides that a court may grant any appropriate 
relief when a right in the Bill has been infringed. Section 172(1)(b) provides 
that, in addition to the obliged declaration of invalidity of a law or conduct 
inconsistent with the Constitution, a court may also make any order that is just 
and equitable, including those listed. The remedies created by the Constitution 
and PAJA are thus not limited but rather emphasise fairness and equitability. In 
the present instance there was no need for the court to decide on the above as 
the claim was not based on a constitutional remedy or PAJA. 
 
The court reiterated that all failures of administrative justice would not be 
 
                                            
81  At 161. 
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the delictual sense, unless one is clear about its nature and the 
motive behind it.82
The court stated that “questions of public policy and the question whether it is 
fair and reasonable to impose delictual liability are decided as questions of law” 
– the policy factors relevant in the particular circumstances should therefore be 
identified and considered, intuitive reaction is unacceptable.
 
 
83 The court then 
discussed the following issues, before concluding that an action for delictual 
damages cannot be inferred from the “statute in question”:84
(a) The general approach to delictual liability for pure economic loss 
caused by administrative breaches;
 
 
85
(b) The duties of the tender board;
 
86
(c) Composition and nature of functions of the board;
 
87
(d) The disappointed tenderer: Loss of profits;
 
88
(e) The disappointed tenderer: Out-of-pocket expenses;
 
89
(f) Overkill and accountability;
 
90
(g) Availability of other remedies; and
 
91
(h) Public versus private tenders.
 
92
 
It can be inferred that the court deemed these issues as relevant policy factors. 
 
The conclusions of the Supreme Court of Appeal on each of the aspects listed, 
were: 
 
 
a) South African law follows a conservative approach to the extension of 
delictual liability and 
                                            
82  Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA) 161-162. 
The Cameu-case referred to is a Canadian decision. 
83  At 162. 
84  At 169. 
85  At 162-163.  
86  At 163-164. 
87  At 164-165. 
88  At 165-166. 
89  At 166. 
90  At 166-167. 
91  At 167-169. 
92  At 169. 
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… although organs of state and administrators have no 
delictual immunity, ‘something more’ than a mere negligent 
statutory breach and consequent economic loss is required to 
hold them delictually liable for the improper performance of an 
administrative function. Administrative law is a system that 
over centuries has developed its own remedies and, in 
general, delictual liability will not be imposed for a breach of 
its rules unless convincing policy considerations point in 
another direction.93
b) The injunctions in the Constitution on procurement and the provincial 
legislation governing the establishment of the tender board and the 
procurement process are primarily directed at the tender board, not 
tenderers. The administrative law duties that follow are not necessarily 
private law duties that may lead to claims for damages.
 
 
The law is also not a seamless web and in administrative decisions the courts 
are concerned with upholding the rule of law and effective decision – making 
processes, not compensation. 
 
94
 
  
c) Most of the members of the tender board were lay persons who, in the 
view of the court, lacked the requisite knowledge and skill to assess the 
tenders properly. They were led by advice and submissions. The board 
was not obliged to accept any or the lowest tender and had to exercise a 
discretion regarding the weight accorded to several factors in the 
adjudication of the tenders.  
 
The court then stated, with reference to the decision in Knop,95
In general, public policy considerations do not favour the recognition 
of damages claims for the wrong exercise of a discretion negligently 
made.
 that: 
 
96
                                            
93  At 162-163. 
94  At 163-164. The court referred to the judgment in Olitzki, as well as an American judgment 
where it was held that similar legislation were promulgated with the intention to protect 
taxpayers and the public, not “material-men and labourers”. 
95  Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 (A). 
 
96  At 164-165. The court also referred to a comment by Lord Slynn in an English case, to the 
effect that authorities who act within their powers are not negligent, but that action beyond 
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d) A disappointed tenderer is not entitled to claim its loss of profits, resulting 
from a tender allocation that is merely invalid. A tenderer’s 'status' to insist 
on a proper process is not founded on its rights, but is founded in “the 
public’s interest in the integrity of the bidding process”. The public may 
have to pay for the same public works twice, should claims like these be 
allowed and such tenderers would be placed in a better position than 
those tendering in the private sector.97
 
 
e) A disappointed tenderer will probably be unable to prove that a loss in the 
form of out-of-pocket expenses is causally connected to an invalid tender 
allocation, as these expenses “would, in any event, have been incurred 
and are always irrecoverable irrespective of whether or not the tender was 
awarded to that party, properly or improperly”. The court considered 
wrongfulness and said: 
 
Unless one is unduly impressed by the floodgate argument, it is 
difficult to appreciate why the nature of the specific economic loss 
should make any difference to the scope of the board’s legal duty. In 
other words, there does not appear to me to be a difference in 
principle between purely economic losses that are out-of-pocket and 
those of another kind.98
f) The court warned against the so called “danger of overkill” and questioned 
the assumption that the imposition of delictual liability would attain (better) 
accountability. Instead, it could have a 'chilling effect' on a “young 
democracy with limited resources,” in that tender processes would be 
considerably slowed down or even grind to a halt.
 
 
99
                                                                                                                               
the authorisation may be negligent. In such cases “the authority is not exercising a 
statutory power, but purporting to do so and the statute is no defence.” The reference to 
what can also be termed the board members’ incompetence raises the question whether 
incompetence of a public authority should be accepted as a defence or rather a factor 
establishing negligence. Even in a country like South Africa where capacity is problematic, 
the fact that the Constitution requires an effective, efficient and accountable administration 
should rather lead to acceptance of incompetence as a factor establishing negligence. 
97  At 165-166. 
98  At 166. 
  
99  At 166-167. The court referred to an argument by an English judge that the imposition of 
delictual liability on administrative organs might lead to delays in administrative processes 
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g) In Knop100
 
 it was stated that the existence of another remedy to rectify an 
administrative breach, may indicate that claims for damages are excluded. 
The court supported this statement with a reference to a Canadian case, 
where it was held that existence of alternative remedies may be indicative 
of the exclusion of actions for damages, especially where orders on review 
would adequately rectify matters and the affected person only experienced 
delay and incurred expenses to invalidate the decision. The court a quo 
emphasised the fact that Balraz, as successful tenderer, had no 
alternative remedy, as –  
Availability of review to an unsuccessful tenderer can hardly be an 
argument for conferring a damages claim on the successful tenderer. 
All that can happen on review is that the tender award may be set 
aside. The successful litigant does not acquire the benefits (or 
burdens) of the successful tenderer. Recently a disappointed 
tenderer, who was able to show that the award was seriously tainted, 
was vindicated on review, though only by an award of costs since 
setting aside the award was impractical as the contract work had 
already been performed. In other words, the suggestion that review 
is an adequate alternative remedy is a misconception.101
Drawing a distinction between the remedies of successful and unsuccessful 
tenderers is undesirable, as this would indicate that the duties owed to these 
two groups by a tender board differ. If the successful tenderer cannot claim 
damages, the unsuccessful tenderer may also not.
 
 
102
                                                                                                                               
due to officials’ expected excessive caution, as well as an argument by a Canadian judge 
that does not share the same apprehension, before apparently opting to follow the first 
approach. 
100  Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 (A). 
101  At 168. 
102  At 168-169. 
 The position of a 
successful tenderer who has entered into a contract and started incurring 
expenses in order to give effect to the contract, is also clearly different from that 
of a hopeful tenderer who has incurred expenses in preparation for the tender, 
or the position of one disappointed tenderer out of a group, who claims a loss of 
prospective profit.  
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h) Private contracting parties may not hold each other delictually liable for 
damages resulting from a void or voidable contract, even if this is the 
result of the fault of one of the parties. The court “can think of no good 
reason why it should be different where the contract is preceded or 
affected by an administrative action.”103
 
 
The court in conclusion held that the statute in question did not give rise to a 
delictual claim for damages that is "purely economic in nature and suffered 
because of a bona fide and negligent failure to comply with the requirements of 
administrative justice”.104 105
4.4 The judgements by the Constitutional Court 
 
 
It is important to note that the court did not cite the floodgates argument in 
support of its decision – it rather emphasised the perceived slowing down of 
administrative processes that would result from the 'overkill' of imposing 
delictual liability.  
 
Moseneke dcj delivered the judgement on behalf of the majority of seven 
judges in the Constitutional Court who dismissed the appeal against this 
decision, while Langa cj and O’Regan j delivered the minority judgement that 
was also supported by Mokgoro j Sachs j, although concurring with the 
majority, delivered a separate judgement.106 All justices agreed that 
constitutional issues were raised and that the substantive issue of unlawfulness 
was under consideration as the Supreme Court of Appeal disposed of the 
matter on this ground.107
                                            
103  At 169. 
104  At 169. 
105  Although this finding was adequate for dismissal of the appeal, the court continued to 
consider the impact of the fact that Balraz was not incorporated at the time it submitted its 
tender. The court held that it had not existed at the time it tendered and did not have a 
certificate to commence business – the act of submission of the tender was in fact unlawful 
and the tender board was not even allowed to consider it. There is no legal duty owed to 
parties who submit invalid or void tenders. At 69-171. 
106  Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007(3) SA 121 (CC). 
 
107  At 130-132. The court stated that procurement is regulated by constitutional provisions and 
legislation enacted in terms of it, as well as the fact that the exercise and control of public 
power is always a constitutional matter. S 195 of the Constitution applies. The evaluation 
R ROOS & S DE LA HARPE  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
148/252 
 
The majority judgement commenced with the approval of Steenkamp’s now 
amended contention, as opposed to its arguments in the court a quo and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, that although the claim is based on delict, the legal 
duty relied upon has its origin in the Constitution and controlling legislation. 
Each “improper performance of an administrative function would implicate the 
Constitution and entitle the aggrieved party to appropriate relief”. Following 
such a breach the facts, applicable constitutional principles and “the controlling 
law” should be considered when deciding upon a remedy that should be fair 
and must vindicate the fundamental right that was violated. The court then 
distinguished between private and public law remedies: 
 
It is nonetheless appropriate to note that ordinarily a breach of 
administrative justice attracts public-law remedies and not private-
law remedies. The purpose of a public law remedy is to pre-empt or 
correct or reverse an improper administrative function. In some 
instances the remedy takes the form of an order to make or not 
make a particular decision or an order declaring rights or an 
injunction to furnish reasons for an adverse decision. Ultimately the 
purpose of a public remedy is to afford the prejudiced party 
administrative justice, to advance efficient and effective public 
administration compelled by constitutional precepts and at a broader 
level, to entrench the rule of law. 
 
Examples of public remedies suited to vindicate breaches of 
administrative justice are to be found in s 8 of the PAJA. It is indeed 
so that s 8 confers on a court in proceedings for judicial review a 
generous jurisdiction to make orders that are ‘just and equitable’. Yet 
it is clear that the power of a court to order a decision-maker to pay 
compensation is allowed only in ‘exceptional cases’. It is unneces-
sary to speculate on when cases are exceptional. That question will 
have to be left to the specific context of each case. Suffice it for this 
purpose to observe that the remedies envisaged by s 8 are in the 
main of a public law and not private law character. Whether a breach 
of an administrative duty in the course of an honest exercise of 
statutory power by an organ of State ought to be visited with a 
                                                                                                                               
and awarding of tenders by tender boards constitute administrative action, in terms of s 38 
of the Constitution a court may grant appropriate relief if a fundamental right as been 
infringed. They were also in agreement that it would be in the interests of justice to grant 
leave to appeal as the questions raised were not clear-cut or frivolous. Prospects of 
success are however not the only factors to be considered – a judgment by the CC would 
give clarity to tenderers and tender boards regarding their obligations and rights, supra 
133. 
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private law right of action for damages attracts different 
considerations to which I now turn.108
The majority started their consideration of the private law liability by scrutinising 
the applicable constitutional provisions, being section 217 (the procurement 
provision) and section 33. Section 217 requires a public procurement system 
that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective and must be 
read with section 33. The provincial tender boards function, and may only act in 
terms of the applicable provincial legislation.
 (Footnotes omitted.) 
 
109
In our constitutional dispensation every failure of administrative 
justice amounts to a breach of a constitutional duty. But the breach is 
not an equivalent of unlawfulness in a delictual liability sense.
 The discretions conferred upon 
it must be exercised honestly and it may not negligently or recklessly disregard 
“the protectable interests of tenderers”. It was common cause that the tender 
board acted in good faith but in conflict with the precepts of administrative law, 
however, this does not automatically lead to a finding that a legal duty was 
breached.  
 
110
… [p]olicy considerations of fairness and reasonableness have to be 
taken into account when imposing a duty of care and ultimately 
liability to make good the harm suffered by a claimant.
  
 
The state is not immune against claims based on invalid administrative action, 
but the negligent breach of a statutory duty that causes loss is not enough to 
establish liability   
 
111
Reference was made to the statement in Knop
 
 
112 that the intention of the 
legislature regarding creation of a statutory legal duty should be the 
fundamental factor determining delictual liability.113
                                            
108  At 134-135. 
109  The court concluded that the final Constitution applied, as the proceedings were not 
pending when it came into operation, Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 
2007(3) SA 121 (CC) 136. 
110  At 137. 
111  At 137.  
112  Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 (A). 
113  At 137-138. 
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The common law test for unlawfulness114 in case of omissions is that the court 
has to find that a failure to fulfil a legal duty existed and that such failure caused 
harm. The existence of a legal duty will be a value judgement on what is 
reasonable and will also include the court’s assessment of the “common 
convictions of society”.115 The principle laid down in Olitzki116 applies – the 
empowering constitutional and statutory provisions have to be interpreted, but a 
common-law duty also requires that the court find it just and equitable to allow a 
civil claim for damages. The reasonableness of the imposition of liability for 
damages depends on a court’s “appreciation of the sense of justice of the 
community” and during this enquiry “broad considerations of public policy”, with 
reference to the Constitution, must also be taken into account.117 As stated in 
Knop, the assessment of unlawfulness is an assessment of objective 
reasonableness and the boni mores, that is the value judgement encompassing 
“all the relevant facts, the sense of justice in the community and considerations 
of legal policy” which are all now based on the values of the Constitution.118
… whether the operative statute anticipates, directly by inference, 
compensation for damages for the aggrieved party; whether there 
are alternative remedies such as an interdict, review or appeal; 
whether the object of the statutory scheme is mainly to protect 
individual or advance public good; whether the statutory power 
conferred grants the public functionary a discretion in decision-
making; whether an imposition of liability for damages is likely to 
have a ‘chilling effect’ on performance of administrative or statutory 
function; whether the party bearing the loss is the author of its 
misfortune; whether the harm that ensued was foreseeable.
 
The relevant facts will include –  
 
119
                                            
114  The term 'wrongfulness' was used, but again the submission is that in delictual context the 
term 'unlawfulness' is more appropriate. 
115  At 138. 
116  Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) 
117  At 138-139. 
118  At 139. 
119  At 140. 
 
 
The majority then considered two main issues: the availability of remedies and 
the possible development of the common law. 
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Appellant contended that the legal convictions of society may demand that 
successful tenderers in the position of Balraz be afforded a remedy in delict, 
due to the following factors: In terms of the contract concluded after awarding of 
a tender, the successful tenderer must perform and has to incur expenses in 
order to do so. The liability would not be for vast amounts, as it would be limited 
to expenses actually incurred. Liability would only be established once 
negligence and causation has also been proved. By imposing delictual liability, 
tender boards will be careful to act in accordance with the constitutional values 
of governmental transparency and accountability.120
The majority expressly declined to express an opinion on the extension of 
delictual liability in cases of “pure economic loss”.
 
 
121
In their consideration of the submissions by appellant, the majority commenced 
with the statement that the absence of an express prohibition of an action for 
damages in the controlling legislation, is not decisive. On the contrary – there is 
no provision in the legislation that explicitly states or implies that “an improper 
but honest exercise of the discretion of the tender board must attract a delictual 
right of action in favour of a disappointed tenderer”.
  
 
122
                                            
120  At 140-141. 
121  At 141. 
122  At 141-142. Moseneke dcj made use of the term ‘disappointed’ – it is not clear whether the 
reference is to unsuccessful tenders or all tenderers who are dissatisfied about something. 
  
 
The majority disagreed with the contention that a successful tenderer like 
Balraz is left without remedy – although it may not apply for review or an 
interdict, it may tender again when the process is restarted. A prudent tenderer 
would also negotiate a contractual term allowing restitution of expenses 
incurred in performance of the contract and should exercise caution in incurring 
such expenses. In reaching this conclusion, the majority assumed that the 
tenderer was an equal contracting party when negotiating the terms of the 
contract after it has been awarded and that a contractual provision regulating 
such occurrences would be better than allowing  
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a blunt remedy of recognising a generic duty of care in relation to 
out-of-pocket expenses incurred on the back of a tender award.123
• The fact that the losses were 'out-of-pocket' is irrelevant – public policy 
“is slow to recompense financial loss of disappointed tenderers” and the 
kind of financial loss does not alter this. 
  
 
The majority held that the common law need not be developed to allow claims 
for damages for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by a successful tenderer 
whose tender is subsequently set aside. Two main reasons were: 
• “[E]ven if there may not be a public law remedy such as an interdict, 
review or appeal, this is no reason for resorting to damages as a remedy 
for out-of-pocket loss”. The reason for this is that the loss “may be 
avoided” and because “it is not justified to discriminate between 
tenderers only on the basis that they are either disappointed tenderers or 
initially disappointed tenderers". Differentiation of this sort would imply 
that tenderers are allocated different rights in “the same tender process” 
and differentiation is not justified as all initial tenderers may take part in 
the new tender process after setting aside of the first tender.124
 
 
Although not elaborated upon, the majority stated that it agreed with “several 
significant findings” of the Supreme Court of Appeal125
a) “Compelling public considerations require that adjudicators of disputes, as 
of competing tenders, are immune from damages claims in respect of their 
incorrect or negligent but honest decisions.” Policy considerations may 
differ in cases where decisions are made in bad faith, corruptly or 
“completely outside the legitimate scope of the empowering provision”.
 and then listed three 
findings it "particularly" agreed with: 
 
126
 
 
                                            
123  At 142. 
124  At 143. 
125  At 143. 
126  At 144. 
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b) The primary aim of the controlling legislation is the establishment of “a fair 
tendering process in the public interest”. The factual context and relevant 
policy considerations may warrant imposition of liability where the 
controlling legislation has a “manifest purpose to extend protection to 
individual members of the public or groups”.127
 
 
c) Allowing delictual claims for damages against tender boards, would 
compromise the “invaluable public role of tender boards”. Review 
applications by unsuccessful tenderers will be followed by delictual claims 
by initially successful tenderers and this “spiral of litigation is likely to 
delay, if not weaken the effectiveness of or grind to a stop the tender 
process”. Again the majority equated the position of successful and 
unsuccessful tenderers by stating that the meagre resources of the 
treasury would be severely taxed if damages were paid to “disappointed or 
initially successful tenderers and still remain with the need to procure the 
same goods or service” – this would be to the detriment of the public at 
large.128
 
 
Although the majority raised the question of validity of the tender and approved 
the finding that Balraz did not exist and did not act in terms of a pre-
incorporation agreement when it submitted the tender, it expressly refrained 
from deciding upon the validity of the tender. It did not consider negligence.129
The minority judgement was delivered by Langa cj and O’Regan j, who only 
considered the question of unlawfulness, as damages can only be claimed if 
the conduct causing the damages was unlawful, rephrased, if a legal duty was 
owed. They decided the question of unlawfulness with full acknowledgement 
  
 
                                            
127  At 144. 
128  At 144. 
129  At 144-146. The minority also did not consider the validity of the tender although 
apparently in support of such a finding (at 157-158). However, they indicated that the 
parties had agreed that the question of negligence should be referred back to the trial 
court, should a finding of wrongfulness ensue, at 147. It is important to note that the 
narrow question was whether the negligent awarding of a tender could be unlawful – 
negligence as factor establishing liability was never considered, only the fact whether 
assumed negligence could give rise to a breach of a legal duty. 
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that the damages in question constituted pure economic loss.130 Like the 
majority, they emphasised that the test for unlawfulness is a normative enquiry 
based on the norms and values of society, also as reflected in the Constitution. 
In the process, relevant norms have to be identified and analysed.131
The empowering statute has to be considered as a starting point. The minority 
also took into account the principles that the tender board had to operate fairly, 
impartially and independently and that the tender system they had to devise, 
had to be fair, public and competitive – principles that were laid down in the 
Interim Constitution.
  
 
132 In addition, these principles (and other in the 
empowering statute) have to be read in the light of the constitutional 
administrative justice clause, as this clause is aimed at protection of the rights 
of participants in the tender process.133 The absence of any provision dealing 
with appeal or review in the empowering statute is of importance as the 
ordinary rules of administrative law apply. The existence of an internal remedy 
has previously been regarded as a factor that may exclude delictual liability.134
The empowering statute is silent on claims for damages. Relevant normative 
principles should therefore be identified and considered in order to establish 
whether the conduct in question was unlawful, taking into account what is just 
and reasonable in accordance with the court’s appreciation of the community’s 
sense of justice, which includes public policy considerations determined by the 
Constitution and the impact the decision will have upon the plaintiff.
  
 
135
They agreed that an unsuccessful tenderer should not be awarded damages for 
a loss of profits,
  
 
136 but distinguished the present case from the facts in Olitzki 
on two grounds:137
                                            
130  At 147. 
131  At 148. 
132  At 148-149. 
133  At 149-150. 
134  At 149. 
135  At 150. The formulation in Olitzki was referred to with approval. 
 
136  At 151-152. Referring to claims by unsuccessful tenderers for loss of prospective profits, 
the minority said: “Whatever the situation may be in society wealthier than ours, to afford 
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a) After awarding of a tender the successful tenderer is obliged to perform in 
terms of the contract and will institute processes to comply with its 
contractual obligations. The unsuccessful tenderer may apply for review to 
enforce his rights and resubmit a tender, whereas the successful tenderer 
is left without a remedy to recover expenses.138
 
 It is undesirable that 
tenderers who are awarded government contracts should hesitate to start 
fulfilling their contractual obligations. They criticise the majority for 
implying that tenderers should do this, as this  
… would undermine the constitutional commitments to efficiency and 
the need for delivery which are of immense importance to both 
government and citizens alike.139
b) Claims for out-of-pocket expenses are much smaller than claims for loss 
of prospective profit. Refusal of claims for out-of pocket expenses by 
successful tenderers “may well render smaller and less financially viable 
tenderers at risk of liquidation.” Empowerment companies, which are 
normally new and financially vulnerable, are often awarded tenders in 
accordance with government’s policy of economic empowerment and 
transformation – if they are expected to incur expenses in order to meet 
contractual obligations, but are then left without a delictual claim for 
damages, they will be financially ruined. There is a marked difference 
between claims for loss of prospective profits and claims to recover “actual 
money spent in good faith … in pursuance of contractual obligations…” as 
this is a “reimbursement for expenses undertook for the benefit of the 
government”.
 
 
140
 
  
                                                                                                                               
an unsuccessful tenderer such a claim in our society would unduly burden the public purse 
that is already beset with more legitimate claims than it can possibly meet.” 
137  At 151-153. 
138  At 151. 
139  At 152. 
140  At 152-153. Allowing claims for loss of prospective profit would be undesirable as it would 
amount to allowing windfalls and would unduly burden the public pursue that is already 
strained by demands on it due to constitutional obligations and the need for social and 
economic reform, as stated in Fose. 
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Liability will enhance accountability in these particular circumstances, but this is 
not the “determinative criterion”, as accountability need not always translate 
into delictual liability, as held in Van Duivenboden.141
… the need to ensure that it is compensated for its bona fide 
expenses, and that it would be unwise not tot do so because of the 
harmful effect that may have on the performance of tender 
obligations.
 The most important 
consideration in favour of tenderers like the present plaintiff is 
  
142
They doubted that the successful tenderer would have an alternative effective 
remedy at its disposal – even if the initially successful tenderer successfully 
participates in a second process, after the initial contract is set aside, it will not 
be able to recover expenses incurred after being awarded the first contract.
 
 
The minority did not attach the same weight to the four other considerations put 
forward by the majority.  
 
143 It 
is unlikely that tenderers have the negotiating power to insist upon inclusion of 
compensation clauses in contracts with the state, but even if they did, the legal 
duty of the tender board not to act negligently outweighs the possibility of such 
bargaining ability.144
The minority agreed that adjudicators should not be held liable for their 
negligent but bona fide decisions, but the decision of a tender board to award a 
tender, is administrative action. Classification of administrative action as 
judicial, quasi-judicial or purely administrative has been held to be untenable 
and the categorising of awarding of a tender as ‘adjudicative’, constitutes a 
return to this flawed approach. The nature of the tender board’s functions is 
such that delictual claims may or may not be allowed, depending on the 
circumstances.
 
 
145
                                            
141 Minister of Safety and Surity v Van Duivenboden 
  
 
2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA). 
142  At 153. 
143  At 154. 
144  At 154.  
145  At 154-155. 
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The purpose of procurement legislation is indeed to ensure fair procurement 
processes in the public interest, but also to protect the rights of participants in 
the process. If interpreted as such, delictual liability may ensue.146
The 'chilling effect' argument is indeed valid, and should be afforded greater 
weight than the 'alternative remedy' argument. However, the minority did not 
foresee the same potential impact as the majority as the losses that could be 
claimed would only be those expenses incurred as a result of the awarding of 
the tender, normal running costs would not even have to be allowed.
 
 
147
a) The nature of the damages under consideration coupled with the 
“desirability of reimbursing successful tenderers for such expenses”.
 
 
The minority was of the opinion that the majority attached the greatest weight to 
their assessment of the nature of the functions of the tender board and the 
chilling effect delictual liability would have on performance by tender boards 
and the fiscus. They stated that the following four factors outweighed these two: 
 
148
b) The constitutional administrative justice clause “seek[s] to vindicate the 
right to administrative justice” of participants in the tender process. 
  
c) Performance of government contracts may be compromised if successful 
tenderers are left without remedy in respect of expenses incurred to fulfil 
contractual obligations. 
d) Empowerment companies may be those hardest hit by declining a 
delictual remedy, while there is a need for such companies to continue to 
partake in the economy.149
 
 
The minority recognised the possibility that section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA may 
in future be developed to properly vindicate the right to administrative justice, 
                                            
146  At 155. 
147  At 155. 
148  At 156. 
149  At 156. 
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but PAJA did not apply to the case.150 The shorter period prescribed by PAJA 
in which proceedings for review must be instituted, will probably limit wasted 
expenses by successful tenderers.151
… that a constitutionalised form of judicial review is intended to 
cover the field, both in substance and remedial terms. To my mind it 
would not only be jurisprudentially inelegant and functionally duplic-
atory to permit remedies under constitutionalised administrative law, 
and remedies under the common law, to function side by side. It 
would be constitutionally impermissible.
 
 
Sachs j, in his separate judgement, agreed with the majority that delictual 
liability is inappropriate, but for a different reason. He regarded it undesirable to 
“develop private law remedies to fill the gap” in instances where losses caused 
by invalid administrative action is sought to be recovered. One of the 
implications of the adoption of administrative justice as a fundamental right, is 
in his opinion  
 
152
He acknowledged that PAJA did not apply at the time the events took place, but 
regarded it as an important expression of public policy at the time. He was also 
of the opinion that a compensation order was possible before enactment of 
PAJA, based on the judgement in Fose
  
 
153 that opened the door for the 
possibility of constitutional damages. Section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA is merely 
the articulation of the public law remedy already implicit in the Constitution. Had 
such an innovative, constitutionally based remedy been pleaded, the difficulties 
in both the majority and minority judgements could have been avoided.154
4.5 Remarks 
 
 
It is doubtful whether tenderers are really in a position to negotiate the terms of 
the contract with government, as the minority also states. Tender documents 
                                            
150  At 157. The minority also referred to the fact that two directives in the European Union 
oblige member states to ensure that adequate remedies exist and “specify the remedies 
that reviewing bodies should have at their disposal”. 
151  At 157. 
152  At 158-159. 
153  Fose v Minister of Safety and Surity 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC).  
154  At 158-159. 
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usually contain pro forma contracts or a set of tender conditions, drawn up by 
the public entity, that have to be accepted by prospective tenderers, failing 
which the tender is not accepted. In the case of state tenders national treasury, 
in 2003, issued standard bidding documents and general conditions of contract 
to which all bids and contracts must be subject and of which the wording may 
not be amended.155
The majority stated that successful tenderers may not “leap without looking”, 
that “Balraz should have curbed its commercial enthusiasm” and that “Balraz 
unnecessarily chose the more hazardous course which is to incur mainly salary 
expenses of its directors without fashioning an appropriate safeguard”.
 The state can and probably will decline to include terms in 
the contract that will favour the tenderer, as it is not legally bound to do so. The 
state is not under these circumstances liable to compensate expenses incurred 
and will certainly not opt to contract to the contrary.  
 
156
If a successful tenderer was contractually obliged to perform at the time it 
incurred expenses directly related to the execution of the tender, it indeed 
 It is 
submitted that these factors are indeed relevant, but not during the enquiry as 
to unlawfulness. The amounts spent and the items they were spent on will have 
to be considered during the causation enquiry. Determination of unlawfulness 
should take place first, then the consideration of causation. A successful 
tenderer who had no share in irregularities that lead to the setting aside of a 
tender award, is indeed required by law to perform in terms of the contract and 
expenses that are incurred directly as a result of this should be seen in a 
different light than those that would have been incurred regardless. As the 
minority stated, running expenses will normally not be causally linked to the 
awarding of the tender. Indeed Balraz’s expenses were mostly directors’ 
salaries that would probably have been incurred in any event, but the basis for 
dismissing the claim should then have been lack of an adequate causal link, not 
absence of unlawfulness.  
 
                                            
155  Practice note number SCM1 of 2003, issued by National Treasury as provided for in the 
Treasury Regulations “Framework for Supply Chain Management” promulgated in 
GG25767 of 5 Dec 2003 in terms of s 76(4)(c) of the PFMA supra n 2.  
156  At 143. 
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placed him in a position quite different to the unsuccessful tenderer who simply 
did not have such a duty. A valid distinction can therefore be made between a 
successful and an unsuccessful tenderer – an unsuccessful tenderer never 
incurs expenses in order to perform in terms of the contract, the successful 
tenderer must.  
 
The majority concentrated on whether there was an alternative remedy 
available and declined to allow claims for damages – when asked to consider a 
development of the common law, in the form of the recognition of a legal duty, 
neither the constitutional values and norms nor the applicable fundamental 
rights were considered. Although Moseneke dcj did state that he agreed with 
“several significant findings” of the Supreme Court of Appeal, one would have 
expected reference to the applicable constitutional provisions and principles 
that applied to the case. Instead, the majority focused on the position of 
disappointed tenderers and the undesirability to differentiate between 
successful and unsuccessful tenderers. 
 
Comparisons were also made to tenderers who take part in tender processes in 
the private sector. One of the reasons for denial of a claim for damages was 
that tenderers in the public sector should not be allowed claims for damages if 
no such claims are allowed in the private sector. Although this appears to be an 
attractive argument, there are vast differences in the two processes. Tenders in 
the private sector are not similarly governed by fundamental rights, 
constitutional procurement provisions and principles of good governance. 
Public procurement processes are and because of this, aggrieved parties may 
approach a court to set aside the awarding of a tender on a number of grounds. 
This is not the case in the private sector where the freedom to award a tender 
is not regulated to this extent and where successful tenderers are not as 
vulnerable to potential review applications and subsequent setting aside of 
contracts. 
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The majority stated that public policy may well allow claims for damages if, inter 
alia, decisions were made “completely outside the legitimate scope of the 
empowering provision”.157 It is uncertain when a decision will qualify as such – 
will an unreasonable decision by a bona fide administrator qualify? Or a 
decision by an unauthorised administrator? Will an irrational decision by an 
incompetent but bona fide administrator qualify? Or a decision based on a 
manifestly unfair procedure? Must one, two, three or four grounds of review be 
present? The problem with such an approach is that it attempts to categorise 
the grounds of review and introduces the idea of grades or levels of 
“wrongness”. The grade or level of negligence or even ignorance will then 
determine the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an administrative decision. Where 
will the boundaries be drawn? In the matter of Minister of Finance v Gore158 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that a delictual claim for damages does lie 
against the procuring entity in the case of fraud. The court held that unlike in 
the Steenkamp matter wrongfulness did exist. It was of the opinion that unlike 
in the Steenkamp and Olitzki cases, where it was said that the imposition of 
delictual liability for loss of profit and out of pocket expenses in the case of an 
innocent wrong awarding of a tender, was too high for the public purse, the cost 
to the public of exempting fraudulent conduct would be too high.159
                                            
157  At 144. 
158  Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA). 
159 Par 88. 
 
 
The majority held that the legislation controlling procurement is mainly aimed at 
ensuring a fair tender process in the public interest, by implication not to protect 
individual members of the public. All these individual members of the public still 
have the fundamental right to just administrative action, as stated by the 
minority. The reasoning of the majority elevates the purpose of legislation to the 
level where the existence and importance of the fundamental right to 
administrative justice and other constitutional norms are of secondary 
importance. 
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The spiral of litigation foreseen by the majority can be avoided if the 
administration simply complies with the principles of administrative law. These 
principles have developed over a long period of time and it is submitted that it 
cannot be said that it imposes an unreasonable burden on the administration. 
Courts will not set aside administrative action on any basis – the grounds of 
review are the requirements for valid administrative action, the fundamental 
right of every person. Capacity need to be developed by government to ensure 
that the constitutional requirements of a procurement system which is fair, 
equitable, transparent and cost effective, are met and that tender boards have 
a proper understanding of the principles of administrative law.  
 
The argument of the majority that allowing claims for damages would severely 
deplete the treasury is curious, as the recommendation made earlier in the 
judgement was that successful tenderers insist upon a clause in their contracts 
with the state to the effect that all expenses incurred in order to perform in 
terms of the contract, should be recompensed in case of the setting aside of the 
awarding of the tender. These amounts would also have to be paid out of the 
treasury. The dispute before the court was limited to this very narrow category 
of potential claimants and expenses, not to unsuccessful tenderers or even all 
expenses incurred by successful tenderers. The nature of a delictual claim is 
that causation would have to be proved and that all expenses would not 
necessarily be compensated. 
 
The comments by Sachs J are obiter as no public law remedy was pleaded. 
However, it could definitely be heeded by prospective litigants. The judgements 
by both the Supreme Court of Appeal and nine of the Constitutional justices, 
were limited to the consideration of delictual liability as pleaded and did not 
exclude the possibility of a public law remedy. A successful tenderer will 
normally be one of the respondents in an application for review and may 
request the award of compensation. The unsuccessful tenderer would be the 
applicant, or one of the applicants. The elements of delictual liability need not 
be pleaded if section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA is relied upon, as the court is 
empowered to make any order that is just and equitable. The compensation 
claimed would have to be substantiated. As unlawfulness and negligence or 
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intent (in the delictual sense) would not be factors under consideration,160
5 Steenkamp, good governance and the provisions of the Model Law 
and the GPA 
 the 
submission is that causation and quantum would have to be proved. The 
proposed approach will exclude the need for litigants to incur additional 
litigation costs and will limit delays – all claims could be disposed of in the same 
procedure.  
 
The clear formulation of the approach to determine unlawfulness in delict by all 
the justices is welcomed, as the role of constitutional norms is now established 
in South African law. The existence and breach of a constitutional norm or 
fundamental right will always be relevant during an enquiry into delictual 
unlawfulness, but will not per se lead to a finding of unlawfulness, as all 
circumstances will be considered in the enquiry and normative policy factors 
will ultimately determine liability.  
 
It is submitted that the composition and functioning of the tender board, in the 
sense that the board may consist of lay persons who do not understand the 
intricacies of the tender process or requirements, should not be a decisive 
factor when the existence of a legal duty is determined. In view of the 
importance of procurement the state should ensure that properly qualified 
people serve on tender boards – ignorance or incompetence should not be 
defences against claims based on infringement of fundamental rights. 
 
 
There can be no doubt that the legal system in South Africa is in accordance 
with the rule of law and that it ensures accountability in public procurement. 
Section 217 of the Constitution in effect encompasses the important principles 
of good governance in public procurement by prescribing a public procurement 
system that has to be in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost effective. The principles of good governance 
                                            
160  Dunn v Minister of Defence 2006 (2) SA 107 (T). 
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are also reflected in section 195 of the Constitution which provides for the basic 
values and principles, including those enshrined in the Constitution that should 
govern public administration. One of these is that public administration should 
be accountable.161 In particular the administrative law of South Africa is well 
developed and is the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair, provided for in section 33 of the Constitution and does 
PAJA162
No country can ever claim to have a perfect legal system or to have good 
governance that can not be improved. Different circumstances, priorities, 
cultures, legal systems and many other differences exist in countries. Due 
deference must be given thereto when evaluating a procurement system and 
whether such system complies with the principles of good governance. 
 now give effect to these rights. 
 
Both the Model Law and the GPA provides that administrative or judicial review 
or both should be available in the case of the breach of a legal duty by the 
procuring entity. As can be expected because of the nature of both the Model 
Law and the GPA the exact remedies that must be available are not prescribed. 
It is however of significance that both provide for the possibility of awarding 
compensation for loss or damages. Such damages may however be limited to 
the costs of tender preparation or protest. 
 
The fact that the courts decided that no delictual liability was incurred in the 
Steenkamp-case does not detract in any way from the appropriateness of the 
South African legal system or the accountability of state organs for their actions 
in the public procurement process. The possibility exists that damages could 
have been awarded if had the claim been based on the applicable statutes and 
not on delict. Since the promulgation of PAJA the possibility exists that a court 
will under similar circumstances allow a claim for damages based on the 
provisions of PAJA.  
 
                                            
161  S 195(1)(f). 
162  PAJA was not applicable to the Steenkamp-case as it was only promulgated after the 
setting aside of the award. 
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Whether one is in agreement with the decisions by the different courts that 
dealt with the Steenkamp-case or not, it can be concluded that the South 
African public procurement system does in this instance comply with the basic 
principles of good governance with regard to accountability.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
Although accountability was an important consideration in the Steenkamp-case, 
it did not lead to a finding of delictual liability, as a number of other measures 
existed to ensure accountability. The approach by Sachs j is supported for 
future adjudication of similar cases as PAJA would be applicable. It would save 
time and costs to dispose of compensation claims at the time of the review 
application. The submission is that the compensation could be awarded in 
terms of section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA or in terms of the courts’ broadly 
formulated discretion in the introductory phrase of section 8(1) of PAJA or 
section 172(1) of the Constitution.  
R ROOS & S DE LA HARPE  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
166/252 
Bibliography 
 
Commission of the European Communities White Paper  
Commission of the European Communities White Paper on European 
Governance 25 July 2001 final 428 (COM Brussels 2001) 
 
Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighborhood 
Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighborhood (Oxford 
University Press Oxford1995) 
 
Curtin and Dekker Good Governance 
Curtin D and Dekker I “Good Governance: The concept and its application 
by the European Union” in Curtin D and Wessel R (eds) Good Governance 
in the European Union (Intersentia Antwerpen 2005) 
 
EC White Paper 200 
European Commission White Paper on Administrative Reform, March 2000 
volume I and II COM (2000) 200 
 
World Bank Report Sub-Saharan Africa 
World Bank Report Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis to sustainable growth (World 
Bank Washington DC 1989) 
 
Wouters and Ruyngaert “Good Governance" 
Wouters J and Ruyngaert C “Good Governance: Lessons from International 
Organizations” in Curtin D and Wessel R (eds) Good Governance and the 
European Union (Intersentia Antwerpen 2004) 
 
Wouters and Ruyngaert Working Paper 
Wouters J and Ruyngaert C Working Paper no 54 Institute for International 
Law (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 2004) 
 
Register of legislation 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 
R ROOS & S DE LA HARPE  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
167/252 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
Government Gazette 25767 of 5 December 2003  
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
Provincial Tender Board Act 2 of 1994 (Eastern Cape) 
Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
 
Register of court cases 
Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province and Others 1999 
1 SA 324 (CC) 
Dunn v Minister of Defence and Others 2006 2 SA 107 (T) 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) 
Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 
Minister of Finance and Others v Gore NO 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 
Minister of Safety and Security v Von Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 
Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board and Another 2001 3 SA 1247 
(SCA) 
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) 
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) 
Stovin v Wise (Norfolk County Council, Third Party) 1996 3 All ER 801 (AC)  
Stovin v Wise (Norfolk County Council, Third Party) [l996] AC 923 (HL) 1996 3 
All ER 801 (AC) 
 
Register of Internet resources 
APEC http://www.apecsec.org.sg/ 21 Feb 
Asia-Specific Economic Co-operation Government Procurement Experts' 
Group [Found on internet] 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec_groups/committees/committee_on_tr
ade/government_procurement.html [Date of use 21 February 2008] 
 
Commission on Human Rights http://www.unhchr.ch/ 21 Feb 
Commission on Human Rights The role of good governance in the 
promotion of human rights Resolution 2000/64 [Found on internet] 
R ROOS & S DE LA HARPE  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
168/252 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.RES.2000.6
4.En?Opendocument [Date of use 21 February 2008] 
 
DAC http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/14/34336126.pdf 17 Jul 
Development Assistance Committee “Guidelines and Reference Series 
Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery” Volume 3: 
Strengthening Procurement Capacities in Developing Countries [Found on 
internet] http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/14/34336126.pdf [Date of use 17 
July 2008] 
 
OECD http://www.oecd.org/ 21 Feb 
OECD About Public Governance and Management [Found on internet] 
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_37405_1_1_1_1_37405,00.ht
ml [Date of use 21 February 2008] 
 
UNESCAP http://www.unescap.org/ 21 Feb 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
What is Good Governance?  [Found on internet] 
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.a
sp [Date of use 21 February 2008]  
 
World Bank http://web.worldbank.org/ 21 Feb 
World Bank Assessment of Country's Public Procurement System  [Found 
on internet] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/ 
PROCUREMENT/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:20108359~menuPK:8
4285~pagePK:84269~piPK:60001558~theSitePK:84266,00.html [Date of 
use 21 February 2008] 
 
Register of treaties and international documents 
Non-Binding Principles on Government Procurement 2006/SOM3/GPEG/005 
UN Doc A/53/1 
 
List of abbreviations 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
R ROOS & S DE LA HARPE  PER/PELJ  2008(11)2 
169/252 
ch chapter(s) 
CPAR  Country Procurement Assessment Report 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
EU European Union 
GPA Government Procurement Agreement 
GPEG Government Procurement Experts Group 
n footnote(s) 
NBP Non-Binding Principles 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
par paragraph(s) 
reg regulation(s) 
s section(s) 
subs sub-section(s) 
UN United Nations 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
PFMA Public Finance Management Act 
